

# Making Security Usable:

Tales of Product Engineering  
...in a Security Company

#data\_security

#cryptography

#product\_thinking

#product\_design

@vixentael



Feel free to reach me with  
security questions.


I do check my inbox :)


Product Engineer




# I. The story


A long time ago in a galaxy far,  
far away...
























Encrypt  
all the data!





';--have i been pwned?

Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach

ceo@startup.com pwned?



best encryption standard



stackoverflow



```
$encrypted= mcrypt_encrypt(  
    MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_128,  
    '54ca04988748501e93a3061763b0b6a',  
    $data,  
    MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,  
    $iv  
);
```



```
$encrypted= mcrypt_encrypt(
```

```
    MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_128,
```

```
    '54ca04988748501e93a3061763b0b6a',
```

```
    $data,
```

```
    MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,
```

```
    $iv
```

```
);
```




PHP. AES-CBC

```
$encrypted= mcrypt_encrypt(  
    MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_128,  
    '54ca04988748501e93a3061763b0b6a',  
    $data,  
    MCRYPT_MODE_CBC,  
    $iv  
);
```



Invite  
pen-testers!





Use pre-built  
tools!



```
export PGENCRYPTIONKEY=db-enc-key  
initdb -k -K pgcrypto /data/dbencrypt/
```

[postgresql encryption options](#)

[cybertec-postgresql.com/en/postgresql-instance-level-encryption/](https://cybertec-postgresql.com/en/postgresql-instance-level-encryption/)

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Hire  
someone?



No data security expertise?  
– Find one.

# II. The challenge

we want one tool that  
solves all problems..



..but how it should work

..and will it really be  
secure now?

key lifecycle

trusted code execution  
environment



side channel resistance

risk echelonization










# database encryption proxy

# database encryption proxy







# Install dependencies

# Hard to build

```
sudo apt-get install git golang libssl-dev
```

# Install themis

- Install dependencies: [Themis](#) cryptographic library:

```
git clone https://github.com/cossacklabs/themis.git
cd themis
make
sudo make install
```

# Pain to manage

```
..tav-notes-app
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] Got new connection to AcraServer:
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] ConnectionManager.Add
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] Handle new connection
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] new secure session
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] connect to server client_id=keypair2
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00] r
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:57-04:00]
```

```
..tav-notes-app
: connect: no such file or directory"
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:58-04:00] Starting service acra-server
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:58-04:00] Validating service configuration
INFO[2018-06-28T10:44:58-04:00] Initialising keystore
selecting transport: use Secure
registering process signal handler
start listening to connections.
```

```
..tav-notes-app
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] new secure session connection to server client_id=keypair2
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] load key from fs: keypair2_server
INFO[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] Load public key for id keypair2
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] load key from fs: keypair2.pub
INFO[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] Load public key for id keypair2
DEBU[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] load cached key: keypair2.pub
INFO[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] Load public key for id keypair2
INFO[2018-06-28T10:43:30-04:00] Load public key for id keypair2
```




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







Listen to customers.  
It improves everything...  
even security!

# III. The adventure





security  
model

encryption  
scheme

cipher  
suits

key/trust  
scheme

- real time analytics (user actions)
- servers load
- error logs
- open tickets / issues
- user testing / user research

- ~~real time analytics (user actions)~~
- ~~servers load~~
- ~~error logs~~
- open tickets / issues
- user testing / user research







Bad Usability



Bad Security



# Data Security Assistance Program

business  
model /  
regulations

risks  
to data

threat  
model / attack  
vectors

data  
security  
scheme

# Analyze use-cases

# Analyze use-cases

Easy to misuse

Hard to deploy

Hard to verify

Hard to support



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# Deployment

# Deployment

Multiple channels of distribution

code

# Deployment

Multiple channels of distribution

code



# Deployment

Multiple channels of distribution

code

built packages (.pkg)

# Deployment

Multiple channels of distribution

code

built packages (.pkg)

chef configuration

docker images

VM images

docker compose

# Deployment

# Deployment

1. Download, build, install every component
2. Generate keys / tokens for each component
3. Put keys into right folders (PK exchange)
4. Configure each component (port, keys)
5. Run components using correct config

# Deployment

1. Download, build, install every component
2. Generate keys / tokens for each component *script*
3. Put keys into right folders (PK exchange)
4. Configure each component (port, keys)
5. Run components using correct config



# Deployment

1. Download, build, install every component

script

2. Generate keys / tokens for each component

3. Put keys into right folders (PK exchange)

4. Configure each component (port, keys)

5. Run components using correct config

# Deployment

1. Download, build, install every component

script

2. Generate keys / tokens for each component

3. Put keys into right folders (PK exchange)

4. Configure each component (port, keys) defaults

5. Run components using correct config

one command!

# Deployment

1. Download, build, install every component

2. Generate keys / tokens for each component

3. Put keys into right folders (PK exchange)

4. Configure each component (port, keys)

5. Run components using correct config

# Deployment

Pre-baked configurations

```
docker-compose -f <compose_file>.yml up
```

# Deployment

Pre-baked configurations

**mysql-ssl-server-ssl.yml**

MySQL <-SSL-> AServer <-SSL-> client

# Deployment

Pre-baked configurations

**mysql-ssl-server-ssl.yml**

MySQL <-SSL-> AServer <-SSL-> client

**pgsql-nossl-server-ssession-connector.yml**

PostgreSQL <-> AServer <-SecureSession-> AConnector <---> client  
'-> AWebconfig

# Deployment

Pre-baked configurations



# Deployment

Integration tests everywhere 🤔

- run on empty environments
- run on 12 OSs
- provide testing scripts for users



# Integration

Good products do not exist in a vacuum

- infrastructure as a code (configs everywhere)
- logging formats (plaintext, json, CEF)
- event formats (unique event codes)



IGNORAMUSKY

# Secure by default

# Secure by default

default strict parameters

pre-defined configuration files

make accidental changes unlikely

# API design

```
1  int encrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned char *key,
2  unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext)
3  {
4  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int len; int ciphertext_len;
5  if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())) handleErrors();
6  if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv))
7  handleErrors();
8  if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
9  handleErrors();
10 ciphertext_len = len;
11 if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len)) handleErrors();
12 ciphertext_len += len;
13 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
14 return ciphertext_len;
15 }
```

# API design

```
from pythemis.scell import SCellSeal

scell = SCellSeal(key)
encrypted_message = scell.encrypt(message, context)

message = scell.decrypt(encrypted_message, context)
```

# API design

easy to use


&&

unambiguous to use

# Naming




# Naming





# Naming



# Naming



# Naming



# Client side

writer

client app

Go

PHP

Nodejs

Ruby

Python



# Docs



no docs



tons of docs

# Docs

for developers

for security ppl

integration scenarios

security model

security recommendations

threat vectors


simple explanations

schemes & formulas

benchmarks



# Playgrounds

 LOGOUT

Add encrypted recordRead/decrypt

Encrypt exact rowRun blocked query

RollbackAdd poison record

Run

- Plaintext for encryption:
- Output: Updated database with a new encrypted entry.
- The client application passes the plaintext data to AcraWriter, which encrypts the sensitive data into an AcraStruct using AcraServer's public storage key.
- The client application performs an INSERT/UPDATE request with the previously created AcraStruct as payload through AcraConnector or directly to the database.

| #  | Name            | Country   |
|----|-----------------|-----------|
| 1  | Armando Bo      | Argentina |
| 2  | Alice Braga     | Brazil    |
| 3  | Keanu Reeves    | Canada    |
| 4  | Vincent Cassel  | France    |
| 5  | Christoph Waltz | Germany   |
| 6  | Takeshi Kitano  | Japan     |
| 7  | Farid Kamil     | Malaysia  |
| 8  | Olga Kurylenko  | Ukraine   |
| 9  | Milka Duno      | Venezuela |
| 10 | Linh Nga        | Vietnam   |

```
$ censor --logging
Run with 'Add encrypted record' action...
.> app: __main__:0x7f47ae2f6080
.> transport: amqp://censor:**@nonprod.livedemo.local:8899/acra-livedemo
.> results: rpc://
.> concurrency: 4 (prefork)
.> task events: OFF (enable -E to monitor tasks in this worker)
[2018-06-18 14:21:53,192: DEBUG/ForkPoolWorker-1] sql p:1 tpl:1.024 sql:0.012 pg:0.002 sum:1.038 size:378
$ rm -rf /
```

who reads docs if you  
can play with simulator?

# Interactive simulator

check your  
encryption works

JSON endpoint

`http://docs.cossacklabs.com/api/ccdUiGOcLNpiwkk/`

User ID

`ccdUiGOcLNpiwkk`

Server ID

`nPZoDirUtbGIGdc`

Server key

`VUVDmgAAAC2pi4vMAiIBsoYiAdXdc7GrG3ZHgVWmeeSMPgqeVa49cjrS21FL`

Paste  Generate


Client public key

[Re-generate server keypair](#) [Hide Logs](#)

[Start Secure session](#) [Start Secure message](#)

Examples-examples-  
examples

# Dogfooding



# There is no absolute security



develop



test



deploy



repeat

Short feedback cycle  
is a key

# IV. Where it got us?



Playgrounds

Secure defaults

Unambiguous APIs

Shipped scripts / libs

Easy deployment





Playgrounds

Secrets

Unambiguous

Shipped scripts / libs

Easy deployment



DON'T ROLL  
YOUR OWN  
CRYPTO



adopt faster

make less mistakes

become less frustrated





iterate faster

plan better

become less frustrated

make user-facing decisions

usable  $\neq$  over-simplified

Alxbngala



# Home reading?

Security as a Product

<https://medium.com/@kshortridge/security-as-a-product-83a78c45ca27>

Organization security for startups

<https://github.com/forter/security-101-for-saas-startups/blob/english/security.md>

API design for cryptography

<https://2017.hack.lu/archive/2017/hacklu-crypto-api.pdf>

Boring crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein

<https://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.10.05/slides-djb-20151005-a4.pdf>

# My other security slides

[github.com/vixentael/  
my-talks](https://github.com/vixentael/my-talks)

DON'T WASTE TIME ON  
LEARNING CRYPTOGRAPHY:  
BETTER USE IT PROPERLY

## KEYS FROM THE CASTLE

ANCIENT ART OF MANAGING KEYS  
AND TRUST

ENCRYPTION WITHOUT  
MAGIC,  
RISK MANAGEMENT  
WITHOUT PAIN

## ZERO KNOWLEDGE ARCHITECTURES

for mobile applications

Building user-centric  
security model  
in iOS apps

@vixentael



Feel free to reach me with  
security questions.

I do check my inbox :)

Product Engineer





# Image credits

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